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That the Government of Mauritius provides nearly every resident over the age of 60 with 
a non-contributory, basic pension is one of the best-kept secrets in the world. The scheme 
dates from 1950 and became universal in 1958, following abolition of a means test. 
Remarkably, introduction of a compulsory, contributory scheme for workers in the 
private sector appears to have strengthened the non-contributory regime without affecting 
its universality. This paper examines the past and future of non-contributory, universal 
pensions in Mauritius, and draws lessons that might be useful for other countries, 
especially those in the developing world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The old age pensioner has throughout the 
years paid taxes on commodities he has 
consumed as everybody else has. He has paid 
taxes on tea, sugar, tobacco, matches, rice, 
pulses, dried fish, rum, calico, khaki, 
everything he has consumed and used to be 
able to live as a useful member of our society. 
One way or another he has contributed to the 
national budget. The Old Age Pension scheme 
being financed out of public funds is [thus] a 
contributory one. The applicant for Old Age 
Pension has already paid in his contributions.” 
 
F.S. Chadien, recorded in Debates 
of the Legislative Council of Mauritius, 
25 June 1957. 
 
Mauritius is a small, subtropical country located 
in the Indian Ocean to the east of Madagascar. It 
was occupied successively by the Dutch in 1598, 
the French in 1715 and the British in 1810. As a 
British colony, it was increasingly self-
governing after 1947. The constitution of that 
year gave voting rights to all adults, including 
women, subject to a test of “simple literacy”. 
Universal suffrage was introduced in 1958 and 
Mauritius became a full, sovereign state in 1968. 
 
At the time of its independence, Mauritius 
suffered from excess population, high 
unemployment and a low standard of living. In 
this stagnant plantation economy, a single 
crop—sugar—accounted for 90% of export 
earnings. Sugar continues to dominate, even 
today, but, beginning in the 1980s, its relative 
importance dropped markedly because of 
increased foreign exchange earnings from 
exports of light manufactures (primarily 
garments) and from tourism. Growth since 1980 
has been persistent and strong, so strong that 
some refer to it as a “Mauritian Miracle” 
(Subramanian and Roy 2001). Life expectancy 
at birth has reached 71 years, 84.5% of the adult 
population is literate, and income per capita, 
measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) 
basis, is 40% that of the USA.
1 The 1.2 million 
residents of Mauritius now have the standard of 
living of a middle-income developing country, 
and the country ranks 67th (between Saint Lucia 
and Colombia) out of 173 countries listed in the 
Human Development Report of the UNDP 
(2002). A consequence of this successful 
development has been a decrease in the birth 
rate and an increase in the number of elderly 
persons in the population: on reaching age 60, a 
Mauritian male can expect to live another 15 
years and a woman an additional 20 years 
(Mauritius Central Statistical Office, 1999, p. 
38). 
 
  Much of this is well known. What is less 
known is that every elderly resident of Mauritius 
receives income support from a system of non-
contributory pensions that dates from 1950.
2 
Subject only to minimum residence requirements 
(12 years from age 18 for citizens, 15 years from 
age 40 for non-citizens), every resident aged 60 or 
over is eligible for a monthly pension that 




•  age 60-89: Rs 1,700 (USD 58)  
•  age 90-99: Rs 6,400 (USD 220)  
•  age 100+:  Rs 7,300 (USD 252)  
 
Those who are totally blind or suffer from total 
                     
1 Another densely populated, former colony—
Singapore—has done even better, and now has a per 
capita income equal to 80% that of the USA. These PPP 
estimates are for the year 2000 and are from Penn 
World Table version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2002). UNDP (2002, pp. 149-152) reports, for the same 
year, PPP per capita incomes for Singapore and 
Mauritius equal only to 68% and 29%, respectively, 
that of the USA, but the UNDP team did not have access 
to the latest Penn World Table at the time it drafted its 
report. 
 
2 I myself was unaware of this long history, and 
erroneously reported (Willmore 2001) that the 
universal pension scheme of Mauritius began with 
passage of the National Pensions Act of 1976. 
 
3 The US dollar equivalents shown are calculated at the 
market exchange rate. The US dollar does, of course, 
have more purchasing power in Mauritius than in the 
USA or other high-income countries.    2  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
paralysis receive an additional benefit of 
Rs 1,205 a month.
4 It is also customary to pay 
all pensioners a “13
th month” bonus at the end of 
each year. As a proportion of per capita GDP, 
these pensions range from approximately 18%, 
for the smallest and most common pension, to 
92% for that of a person aged 100 years or more 
and severely disabled. 
 
  These basic pensions are not income-tested, 
nor are they retirement-tested. They are taxable 
as ordinary income, however, so those who 
continue to work, or have other sources of 
income, return some of their pension to the 
government in the form of tax. All pensioners 
aged 90 years or more pay some income tax, 
even if they have no other income, unless they 
have deductions for dependents or other 
allowable expenses. The rate of income tax in 
Mauritius is now nearly flat, with only two 
brackets: 15% for the first Rs 25,000 of taxable 
income, and 25% for all additional income. The 
basic personal deduction is Rs 60,000, 
equivalent to income of Rs 5,000 a month. In 
addition, all consumers, pensioners and workers 
alike, pay value added tax (VAT) on most goods 
and services, at a rate of 12 percent. 
 
  The history of universal pensions in 
Mauritius is not readily available and is 
incomplete even in this paper, which is a work in 
progress. For this reason the paper contains more 
details than may be welcomed by casual readers. 
Such readers may want to skim or skip the next 
section, as well as section 5, titled “Contributory, 
income-related pensions (from 1978).” The other 








                     
                    
4 In mid-1997, 11% of all pensioners, including 39% of 
those over age 80, were blind or paralysed, so qualified 
for a disability supplement (Mauritius Central 
Statistical Office, 1999, p. 35). 
2.  NON-CONTRIBUTORY, 
BASIC PENSIONS (FROM 1950) 
 
The British Governor of Mauritius became 
concerned that workers in the colony were 
relying on Government for relief in their old 
age, so appointed in January of 1940 a Social 
Insurance Committee to look into the possibility 
of implementing a system of old age pensions. 
In January of 1941, the Committee concluded 
that it was “inequitable that the full 
responsibility of providing for the aged should 
be transferred entirely from the family to the 
taxpayer. The breakdown of the old system 
demands that it should be replaced by a new one 
based on the principle of ‘self-help’ and the 
most practicable means of ensuring this is a 
contributory pension scheme” (unpublished 
Report of the Social Insurance Committee, 
quoted in Titmuss and Smith, 1961, p. 85).  
 
The Social Insurance Committee 
recommended a compulsory system of flat 
contributions (6 cents per day of work, divided 
equally—2 cents each—among the worker, the 
employer, and the Government), with benefits 
strictly proportional to contributions paid. The 
programme targeted the poor, so would exclude 
those with an annual income of Rs 600 or more. 
One member of the Committee (Dr. E. Millien, 
who represented the “coloured community”
5) 
wrote a lengthy dissenting report, accusing his 
colleagues of attempting to shift the cost of old 
age relief from the taxpayer to workers, who 
were desperately poor and could not afford to 
pay contributions (Titmuss and Smith, 1961, p. 
86). The Government Actuary of Great Britain 
in 1943 questioned many details of the 
Committee’s proposal, even whether the Colony 
could afford social insurance, but agreed that 
any scheme adopted should be “not a scheme of 
 
5 “Coloured community” was used at that time to refer 
to descendants of African slaves, the vast majority of 
whom were living in poverty.  The Social Insurance 
Committee included also a representative of Indian 
labour, who did not support Dr. Millien. The remaining 
six members of the Committee represented the interests 
of employers, insurance companies, and Government 
(Mauritius, 1948, p. 3).   3  Universal Pensions in Mauritius    
non-contributory pensions subject to a means 
test … but a scheme of pensions payable as of 
right and financed…by insurance contributions” 
(Mauritius, 1948, p. 7). 
 
By 1950, there was still no system of 
contributory pensions in place, so Government 
tabled on 21 March of that year legislation for a 
non-contributory system, intending it as a 
stopgap measure to be used until a ‘proper’ 
system of social insurance could be set up. The 
intent was to begin payments of pensions in 
April 1950, but these did not actually commence 
until September, with arrears paid from 1 July. 
The qualifying age was set at 65, and the 
maximum monthly pension of Rs 15 (Rs 5 more 
than “outdoor relief”) was reduced by the full 
amount of income from other sources. This strict 
means test caused much resentment, so in 
December 1950 the income ceiling was raised to 
Rs 30 a month (the first Rs 15 of income was 
disregarded).  
 
  In 1953 the Old Age Pensions Bill was 
amended to reduce the qualifying age for women 
from 65 to 60 years, increase the maximum 
pension to Rs 20 a month, change the income 
test from a monthly to an annual basis, and raise 
the income ceiling to Rs 35 (Rs 420 a year). 
Pensioners at the end of 1953 numbered 19,000, 
and would have reached 24,000, had the means 
test not excluded 5,000 elderly persons. (See 
figure 1 and appendix A.) 
 
  Non-contributory, basic pensions were 
popular and functioned smoothly, yet 
Government never abandoned its dream of 
replacing them with a contributory system. The 
Governor appointed a Committee of Ministers 
that recommended, in September of 1957, 
implementation of a system that would be flat 
rate, contributory and compulsory. This was a 
system identical to the one proposed by the 
Social Insurance Committee in 1941, except that 
contributions would be payable weekly rather 
than daily, and would be collected from all 
workers younger than 60, even—at reduced 
rates— from child workers aged 14 to 18 
(Titmuss and Smith, 1961, pp. 89-90).
6  
 
Government failed to follow up on the 
recommendations of the Committee of 
Ministers. Instead, the Minister of Health and 
Social Services, in response to a question from 
the floor of the Legislative Council, made a 
surprising announcement on 13 December 1957 
that Government had decided to abolish the 
means test for old age pensions. The minister 
also announced that the monthly pension would 
increase from Rs 20 to Rs 22, to be paid 
retroactively from July 1957.  
 
  The abolition of the means test in 1958 
added approximately 6,000 to the number of old 
age pensioners, who came to total 25,783 at the 
end of 1958. Universal, basic pensions cost 
Government one percent of GDP in that year. 
The minister responsible for administering old 
age pensions alleged that a portion of the 
increased costs were offset by reduced costs of 
administration, but he was unable to quantify the 
savings. Pensions were taxable as income, so a 
portion was also recovered, or ‘clawed back’ 
from the wealthy. A pensioner in the highest tax 
bracket retained, in 1958, only 4 rupees of a 22 
rupee pension. Government did not quantify 
these savings, either. 
 
  At the historic moment of extending old 
age pensions to everyone, Government Ministers 
were apologetic, insisting that the measure was 
temporary, that it would be dismantled once a 
proper system of contributory pensions was in 
place. The Minister of Health and Social 
Services confidently informed the legislature 
that “in less than two years’ time, there would be 
established in this country a complete and 
comprehensive social security scheme, 
contributory this time, by which the amount of 
old age benefit is going to be higher….” He 
added,     “There  will   be  of course   no  burden 
                     
6 Titmuss and Smith (1961, pp 107-111) also 
recommended compulsory, contributory pensions, but 
would exclude, at least initially, low-paid and unskilled 
workers, who could make do with a basic pension. 
These contributory pensions were designed to 
supplement universal, non-contributory pensions, not to 
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Pensioners (actual) 
Elderly persons (estimate) 
Figure 1. Coverage of Basic Pensions in Mauritius 





Source: Appendix A. 
Note: Data are end-year through 1971, mid-year from 1972. 
         Pensioner data missing for 1960, 1963 and 1981-84. 
placed on the coming generations as soon as this 
contributory scheme is introduced. This present 
measure, I repeat, is but temporary so far as it is 
non-contributory and also as far as the amount 
of Rs 22 is concerned” (recorded in Mauritius, 
Debates, 8 April 1958). 
 
Contributory pensions were introduced, not 
in 1960, but much later, in the year 1978. To 
date, they have not replaced universal, non-
contributory pensions. I postpone discussion of 
this parallel system of pensions until section 5, 
in order to focus first on non-contributory 
pensions. 
 
In 1965 Government lowered the qualifying 
age to 60 years for everyone and, at the same 
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Figure 2. Real Average Basic Pension in Mauritius 
(index, 1995=100) 
Source: Appendix A. 
Note: Nominal pension deflated by consumer price index. Consumer 
    price index missing for 1950-1962. Pension data missing for 1981-84. 
        
testing: elderly persons with sufficient income to 
be subject to payment of tax were disqualified.
7 
The basic pension remained at Rs 22 a month for 
more than 14 years, until it was increased to Rs 
25 in November 1971. It was increased again on 
several occasions, beginning in 1973, but its 
value in real terms, adjusted for changes in 
consumer prices, remained low through 1975. 
(See figure 2.) 
In 1976, as part of the National Pensions 
Act (which introduced mandatory, contributory 
pensions), Government increased sharply the 
size of the non-contributory pension and, even 
more surprising, abolished the means test. This 
measure caused the real, price-adjusted value of 
the pension to increase and, except for a fall in 
the early 1980s, it has continued to rise ever 
since. (See figure 2 once again.) It is not known 
how many elderly were excluded from pensions 
by the ‘income tax’ test in effect from 1965, but 
the apparent coverage of pensions (ratio of 
pensioners to number of elderly persons) 
increased from 93% in mid-1976 to 98% in mid-
 
                     
7 At least 1965 appears to be the date these two 
measures were introduced. It is the first year that I 
found mention of them in the Debates of the Legislative 
Council.   6  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
1977, so 5% is a reasonable estimate.
8 
 
The next major change in non-contributory 
pensions was announced by the Minister of 
Finance in his budget speech of 11 October 
1983, and implemented the following month. 
For the first time, higher pensions were provided 
for the very old, namely Rs 200 for those aged 
75-89 and Rs 300 for those aged 90 and over, 
compared to Rs 174 for younger pensioners. 
From a reading of the parliamentary debates of 
1983, it is not clear why Government chose to 
favour the very old in this way. What is clear is 
that increased pensions for the very old were 
popular, and easier to finance than a similar 
increase in generosity toward old age pensioners 
of all ages. 
  
By 1995, a fourth age group, the over 100, 
had been created, though this must have been a 
very small group indeed. For the fiscal year 
ending June 1996, monthly pensions for the four 
groups were as follows: 
 
•  age 60-74: Rs   675 (USD 38)  
•  age 75-89  Rs   840 (USD 47) 
•  age 90-99: Rs 3,900 (USD 220)  
•  age 100+:  Rs 4,000 (USD 226) 
 
In July of 1996, the first two age groups 
were merged, and remain so today; monthly 
pensions for the three respective age groups 
were set at: 
 
•  age 60-89: Rs 1,000 (USD 55)  
•  age 90-99: Rs 3,900 (USD217) 
•  age 100+:  Rs 4,000 (USD 222)  
 
In July of each subsequent year, these pensions 
                     
8 There is additional evidence that supports the 5% 
estimate for those disqualified by the means test. The 
Prime Minister, in response to a question from a 
member of the legislature, stated that the number of old 
age pensioners who were taxpayers in 1981/82 and 
1982/83 was 2650 and 2940 respectively. I do not have 
statistics on the number of pensioners in those years, 
but they must have numbered about 62,000 and 66,000 
respectively. If these estimates are correct, 4.4% of old 
age pensioners paid income tax in those years, which is 
a figure quite close to the 5% estimate for 1976/77. 
were increased by an amount well in excess of 
price inflation and, most often, greater than the 
increase in average earnings as well. By July of 
1998 (possibly sooner) there existed a 
supplemental payment for severely disabled 
pensioners equal to 70% of the smallest basic 
pension. 
 
  From figure 1 and appendix A, it is clear 
that pension coverage in Mauritius has been 
truly universal since 1977. In fact, since 1994 
coverage has been more than universal, reaching 
an estimated 103 to 108% of the population 
older than 60 years of age. Some of this apparent 
over-coverage may reflect under-estimation of 
the elderly population by the Central Statistical 
Office. The population census for the year 2000 
did enumerate a total of 107,462 persons over 
the age of 60, which is more than the 105,234 
estimated by the Central Statistical Office, but 
this still leaves 4,423 of the 111,885 pensioners 
unaccounted for. Unless the population census is 
wildly inaccurate, four thousand or so old age 
pensioners are under-aged or deceased. 
Mauritius has a reputation for accurate 
registration of births, so, if there is fraud, it more 
likely stems from failure to report deaths than 
from false claims of old age. 
 
  For one who has never visited Mauritius, it 
is difficult to speculate on what role fraud might 
play in explaining apparent coverage ratios that 
exceed 100%. Nonetheless, generous pensions at 
advanced ages are an incentive for adult children 
or grandchildren to delay reporting the death of 
an elderly parent or grandparent. Any individual 
in Mauritius can collect the pension of an elderly 
person, simply by presenting the pensioner’s 
identity card at a pay point. This is convenient 
for pensioners, but it does facilitate fraud. In 
other developing countries, this type of fraud is 
not unknown. In Namibia, for example, “it was 
common for pensions to be collected by 
grandchildren up to ten years after a pensioner 
was actually deceased.” (Schleberger, 2002, p. 
14). This activity ended only after authorities 
began to require the elderly to collect pensions 
in person, presenting fingerprint identification 
along with their identity card. Basic pensions in 
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Figure 3. Ratio of Average Pension to per capita GDP 
                (percentages, 1950-2001) 
Source: Appendix A. 
Note: Pension data missing for 1960, 1961, 1963 and 1981-84. 
+ 
and non-contributory, but it is worth noting that 
changing to a means-tested or contributory 
system would not prevent this type of fraud, 
except as a by-product of reducing the number 
of pensioners. 
 
  As figure 2 shows, the purchasing power of 
the old age pension in Mauritius has increased 
steadily since the mid-1980s, and by 2001 was 
2.6 times higher than its previous peak of 1978. 
The record of pensions in relation to per capita 
income, which is a measure of the relative 
standard of living of those who rely on a basic 
pension for income, is more mixed. It is true that 
the pension has tended over half a century to 
retain its value as a percentage of per capita 
GDP but, as can be seen in figure 3, there has 
been enormous fluctuation in this statistic. The 
ratio of the average pension to per capita GDP 
statistic increased from about 12% 1990 to 21% 
in recent years, but remains below the 24.3% 
recorded in 1958. The lowest ratio was 11.1%, 
recorded in 1975.   
 
3.  THE COST OF UNIVERSAL 




“The worry about ageing is much ado about 
rather little….  Economists should stop being so 
dismal.  All it will take is a little imagination 
and courage for most…countries to enjoy their 
escape from the age-old tyranny of early death.” 
 
--- Martin Wolf, writing in the Financial Times, 
6 February 2001. 
 
Mauritius has a population that is ageing, in 
the sense that birth rates have fallen, and people 
are living longer, so the ratio of the population 
of working age to the population of pension age, 
known as the pensioner support ratio, is falling. 
With these demographics, some question   8  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
whether the country can afford to retain its 
system of universal pensions, at least at their 
present level of benefits. The purpose of this 
section is to argue that such fears, while 
understandable, are exaggerated. So long as per 
capita GDP continues to grow (or doesn’t fall), 
there is no cause for alarm. The denominator of 
per capita GDP, after all, includes both workers 
and non-workers. If there is a crisis because of 
demographics despite economic growth, it will 
be a crisis of politics (distribution), not a crisis 
of production. 
 
The scenario that is supposed to be so 
alarming for Mauritius is shown in table 1. All 
figures are either taken directly from, or 
calculated from, those reported on pages 8-9 and 
20-24 of the Actuarial Review of the Mauritius 
National Pensions Fund as at 30 June 2000, 
with some exceptions. The main exceptions are 
the addition of the year 1970 (for comparison 
with the past) and the addition of a later 
retirement age (to see how this affects costs). 
The actuaries used the demographic projections 
of the Central Statistical Office, as does table 1 
for the projections of population aged 60-64 
years. Also, the actuaries include disability and 
survivors’ pensions in their projections. Table 1 
ignores these pensions because ageing increases 
only costs of old age pensions; in fact, there will 
be fewer young widows and orphans as people 
live longer and healthier lives. 
 
  Assuming everyone begins paid work at 
age 15 and retires at age 60, the number of 
workers per retiree is projected to fall from 7.4 
in the year 2000 to 2.5 by the year 2040. (See 
table 1.) In other words, in less than forty years 
there will be only 2.5 workers to support each 
pensioner. Three comments can be made 
regarding this projection. First, the trend is not a 
new one: the ratio has fallen since 1970, yet the 
pension programme is stronger today than it was 
thirty years ago. Second, it assumes that the 
population can be divided by age into two 
distinct groups: workers and non-workers. In 
reality, many non-workers, such as students, 
unpaid caregivers and the unemployed are in the 
15-59 year age group, and many of those older 
than 60 continue to pay taxes and work for pay. 
Third, 60 as an age for pension eligibility is 
arbitrary. With increased life expectancy, it 
should be feasible to phase in a later retirement 
age, such as 65. If this were done, the pensioner 
support ratio would fall by the year 2040 only to 
3.9, instead of 2.5. (See table 1 once again.) 
 
  The most important defect of the pensioner 
support ratio, however, is that changes in it do not 
necessarily correlate with changes in the affordability 
of old age pensions. To calculate affordability, three 
statistics are required: per capita GDP, the average 
pension, and the proportion of pensioners in the 
overall population of the country. As shown 
elsewhere (Willmore, 2001), the cost of pensions (as 
a proportion of GDP) is equal to the proportion of 
pensioners in the population times the ratio of the 
pension to per capita GDP. 
 
GDP per capita is a crucial variable; with 
larger incomes, many things become affordable, 
including generous pensions for large numbers 
of retirees. The actuaries (on advice of 
Government) assume that per capita GDP will 
increase much more slowly in the future than it 
has in the past. In the thirty years from 1970 to 
2000, per capita GDP increased more than 
threefold, from 28 to 100 thousand rupees, in 
constant prices of the year 2000. In the thirty 
years to 2030, it is projected to increase by less 
than 50%. Nonetheless, real incomes are 
projected to rise, albeit at a slower pace. 
Mauritians in the year 2040 are likely to enjoy a 
higher standard of living than those of the year 
2000, 76% higher, on the assumptions the lie 
behind the figures of table 1. 
 
  For average pension, the actuaries worked 
with two different projections: (1) pensions 
indexed to average earnings (assumed to follow 
per capita GDP) and (2) pensions indexed to 
consumer prices. In the past, with much 
fluctuation, basic pensions have adjusted in line 
with earnings. If we assume this holds for the 
future, pensions will increase by the same 
amount as per capita GDP: 76% by the year 
2040, to an annual pension of 37,000 rupees   9  Universal Pensions in Mauritius    
 
Table 1. Cost of Universal Pensions in Mauritius, 1970-2040. 
          
Year  1970  2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 
GDP (million rupees, constant prices) *  23369  119085  152191  178151  214710  258176 
                          
Total Population (thousand)  829  1186  1292  1379  1440  1465 
  Children (0-14)  351  305  292  285  280  272 
  Working ages (15-59)  430  776  859  879  870  855 
  Pension age (60+)  48  105  140  215  290  338 
  Pension age (65+)      88  141  212  244 
          
Pensioner support ratio (%, 15-59/60+)  9.0  7.4 6.1 4.1 3.0 2.5 
Pensioner support ratio (%, 15-64/65+)      10.4 6.8 4.5 3.9 
          
GDP per capita (thousand rupees) *  28  100  118  129  149  176 
          
Average pension (thousand rupees) *        
  Indexed to earnings  5  21  25  27  31  37 
  Indexed to prices      21  21  21  21 
          
Pension costs with pension age of 60 (% of GDP) **      
  Indexed to earnings  1.1  1.9  2.3  3.3  4.2  4.8 
  Indexed to prices      1.9  2.5  2.8  2.8 
          
Pension costs with pension age of 65 (% of GDP) **      
  Indexed to earnings      1.4  2.1  3.1  3.5 
  Indexed to prices        1.2  1.7  2.1  2 
          
* All rupee values are in constant prices of the year 2000.         
          
** Assumes 100 per cent coverage of population of pension age. Actual coverage was 90% in 1970 
because  
of means testing and 106% in the year 2000 due to under-estimation of elderly population and payments to  
deceased  pensioners.          
          
Memorandum: annual growth of  GDP  GDP per capita     
1970-2000  5.6%  4.3%      
2000-2040  2.0%  1.4%      
          
Source: Author's calculations, based on projections of Mauritius Ministry of Social Security, Actuarial Review 
of the Mauritius National Pensions Fund as at 30 June 2000 (Report by Government Actuary’s Department,  
London, UK, December 2001) and population estimates of the Central Statistical Office of Mauritius. 
   10  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
(Rs 2,850 a month
9) in prices of the year 2000. 
The pension as a proportion of GDP remains the 
same (0.21), but the proportion of pensioners in 
the population increases from (105/1186=0.09) 
to (338/1465=0.23), so pension costs as a 
proportion of GDP increase from (0.21)(0.09) to 
(0.21)(0.23), that is, from 1.9% to 4.8%. Is this 
affordable? Well, per capita GDP will be 76% 
higher so, even if workers sacrifice 3% of their 
income in higher taxes, they will be much better 
off in the future than they are today, so can 
easily allow their retired parents and 
grandparents to share in this prosperity. 
 
  If political will and courage are lacking, 
there are numerous ways to reduce the cost of 
basic pensions. One way, shown by the 
actuaries, is to index pensions by prices rather 
than by earnings. This results in a constant 
pension of 21,000 rupees (Rs 1,600 a month), in 
year 2000 prices, for a cost in 2030 and 2040 of 
2.8% of GDP. Another way to reduce costs is to 
increase from 60 to 65 the qualifying age for a 
pension. This calculation was not shown by the 
actuaries, but is shown in table 1. With this 
option, pension costs increase to 3.5% of GDP 
when indexed to earnings, and to 2% of GDP 
when indexed to prices. A third way to reduce 
costs is to subject applicants to a means test 
rather than grant old age pensions on a universal 
basis. This type of cost-cutting measure is 
examined in some detail in the next section of 
the paper. 
 
  In conclusion, the universal pensions of 
Mauritius are affordable, even with no change in 
the qualifying age for an old age pension, and 
even if pensions increase with per capita GDP to 
accompany changes in the standard of living of 
the country. If the qualifying age were to 
increase from 60 years to 65, which could be 
justified because of increased life expectancy, 
the pensions would become even more 
affordable. It comes down to political will, of 
collectively deciding whether universal pensions 
represent good value for taxpayers’ money. 
 
                     
9 Division of 37,000 is by 13 rather than 12, allowing for 
a ‘13
th month’ bonus. 




Policymakers in Mauritius, from the very 
beginning, sought to reduce the fiscal cost of old 
age pensions by subjecting applicants to a test of 
individual income or, if married, to a test of the 
combined income of the applicant and his or her 
spouse. They succeeded in reducing the number 
of old age pensioners by about 20 or 25 per cent 
compared to what might have been expected 
with a universal programme. Some members of 
the Legislative Council wanted to cut costs even 
more with a harsher means test, one that takes 
into account not only income of a spouse, but 
also potential alimony from sons or daughters. 
Government, they argued, should force children 
to care for their aged parents; it should provide a 
pension to someone in poverty only if the person 
has no adult children, or if those children also 
live in poverty. A motion to tighten the means 
test in this way was introduced in course of 
debate of the Old Age Pensions (Amendment) 
Bill, and narrowly defeated by a vote of 13 to 
12, with two abstentions (Debates, 30 June 
1953). 
 
  As Mauritius gained experience with non-
contributory pensions, calls to tighten rules of 
eligibility subsided, and discontent with means 
testing grew. In 1958, Government abolished 
means tests and began to award old age pensions 
to all who qualified by age, subject only to a 
residency requirement. Mauritian policymakers 
learned that even though means tests promise 
great benefits by targeting benefits, they also 
have social costs that offset their budgetary 
appeal.  
 
Amartya Sen (1995, pp. 12-13), in a well-
known essay on “The Political Economy of 
Targeting”, discusses four major social costs of 
means tests: 
 
  Disutility and stigma 
  Informational distortion 
  Incentive distortion 
  Administrative and invasive losses   11  Universal Pensions in Mauritius    
Mauritius suffered all but the first of these 
costs. Stigma never arose because the 
overwhelming majority of the elderly population 
qualified for a pension. Pensioners might 
become stigmatised as paupers had Government 
tightened the test to take into account income of 
their adult children, but this did not happen. 
 
  Informational distortion inevitably 
accompanies means testing because an applicant 
communicates information to Government in “a 
system that rewards cheating and penalizes 
honesty” (Sen, 1995, p. 12). Honest citizens in 
Mauritius who reported their earnings were 
shocked to see their pensions reduced by the full 
amount. They quickly learned to hide their true 
income. In the words of one member of the 
Legislative Council, it became “difficult to 
assess the true position of those poor people and 
furthermore it does not profit the Government to 
such a large amount of money” (Debates, 4 
December 1951). 
 
  Even if applicants were to provide honest 
and complete information to Government, the 
existence of a means test discourages the elderly 
from working and penalizes those who to save 
for their own old age. This is the “incentive 
distortion” highlighted by Amartya Sen. 
Legislators in Mauritius became aware of this 
very early. In the debate over a bill to relax the 
means test by increasing the amount of 
allowable income (Debates, 4 December 1951), 
one member of the legislature stated “I do not 
think it is just that Government should think that 
a person who is allowed a pension of Rs 15 per 
month should not be encouraged to work if he or 
she can work.” Another complained “the one 
who has made savings through sacrifices seems 
to be penalized as compared with the one who 
has been spending all his wages during his 
working life time.” 
 
  A major complaint against the means test 
was the power that it gives bureaucrats, and the 
corruption that sometimes accompanies this 
power. A government minister explained that 
this was a key reason that Government decided 
to table legislation in 1958 to abolish the means 
test: 
“[We] know that if an unfortunate 
person applies for old age pension and does 
not have any support, it would take months 
… [to] obtain the old age pension.  I can 
very well understand why certain elements 
in the country are against the doing away of 
the means test. Once this is got rid of, every 
person who is entitled to receive old age 
pension would be able to apply for it and, 
as a matter of law, as a matter of right, will 
be entitled to it. It will not be a question of 
whether one Member of the House or some 
of his friends happen to be persona grata 
with certain officers.... This is one way in 
which up to now political power has been 
obtained in certain quarters in this country. 
This is a fact, ... and this is one of the things 
which this Government has decided to 
stop.” (Mr. Rault, Debates, 1 April 1958) 
 
When an applicant has right to a pension 
simply by submitting proof of age, the government 
official has little power. When an official is asked 
to certify the income of an applicant, he obtains 
power, which provides opportunity for corruption 
and for abusive invasion of privacy. A 
backbencher noted this with particular clarity, in 
the same session of the legislature: 
 
  “[T]he abolition of the means test will 
help…by not giving the opportunity to the 
[public assistance] officers to do the things 
they are now doing: long process of 
enquiries, asking information from the 
neighbours as to whether So and So is 
working, whether So and So is the lessee of 
so many acres of land or whether So and So 
is maidservant at Mr. So and So’s place. At 
least the proof that the person has reached the 
qualifying age will put the officer in an 
obligation to give that person his assistance 
and nothing more. And if there is not other 
reason, for this single reason, I am going to 
vote for this Bill.” (Mr. Boolell, Debates, 1 
April 1958) 
 
  The mild means test that was in effect from 
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administrative and invasive costs because the test 
was simple: if you file and pay income tax, you do 
not qualify for an old age pension. This rule gave 
no discretionary power to bureaucrats, and was not 
intrusive. Nor did it stigmatise pensioners, for the 
vast majority of the elderly in Mauritius do not file 
income tax. Nonetheless, the test did not avoid the 
other two social costs: informational distortion and 
incentive distortion. It provided citizens with yet 
another reason to distort information, to hide their 
income, to avoid filing an income tax return. 
Those who filed a return lost their entire pension, 
equivalent to a tax of at least 100% on the pension, 
even higher in the case of incomes that were only 
borderline taxable, since the old age pension itself 
was not taxable. For some, this was a powerful 
incentive to work very little after reaching age 60, 
and a disincentive for younger workers to save for 
their own old age. 
 
  The ‘income tax’ test could have been a 
good one, with a slight modification. Instead of 
recovering the entire pension from those with 
any taxable income, Government should have 
imposed a surcharge on income of pensioners at 
a modest rate, one which would not destroy 
incentives to work and save, and would apply 
only until the net old age pension becomes zero. 
This type of “claw back” was applied for many 
years in New Zealand, a country that, like 
Mauritius, has a tradition of non-contributory 
pensions. The surcharge in New Zealand 
functioned well, though it was removed in 1998 
in order to restore universality (St. John and 
Willmore, 2002). 
 
The functioning of a surcharge can be made 
clear with an example, using the basic pension in 
Mauritius, which in the current fiscal year 
amounts to Rs 22,100 a year and is fully taxable. 
The first Rs 25,000 of taxable income is subject 
to tax at the rate of 15%. Additional income is 
taxed at 25%, so even the wealthiest person 
retains a pension of Rs 16,575, net of tax. 
Suppose, now, that pensioners are charged a 
surtax of 20%, up to the point where their entire 
pension has been ‘clawed back’. In this example, 
our pensioner would pay a 20% surtax on her 
first Rs 110,500 of taxable income, which would 
mean a total tax at the rate of 35% on the first Rs 
25,000 of taxable income, 45% on the next Rs 
85,500 of income, and 25% (without surcharge) 
on all additional income. For those with larger 
pensions, such as persons over the age of 90, the 
surcharge would apply, with the same principle, 
to a larger amount of taxable income. 
 
  Should Mauritius choose to restore a means 
test for basic pensions, careful consideration 
should be given to recovering pensions from the 
wealthy with a surcharge on their taxable 
income, at a moderate rates. This type of income 
test avoids or minimizes all four social costs 
associated with means tests: stigma, distorted 





RELATED PENSIONS  
(FROM 1978) 
 
  “The non-contributory pension scheme 
should continue to exist side by side with this 
contributory scheme, the former declining as the 
latter develops. In due course it would be possible 
to reintroduce a [tighter] means test as part of the 
non-contributory scheme.”  
 
  -- A.E. Goddard, Report to the 
Government of Mauritius on the Planning 
of Social Security (International Labour 
Office, Geneva, 1970), p. 53. 
 
Government’s long-awaited contributory 
pension scheme was approved by the National 
Pensions Act of 1976, but began to operate only 
in July of 1978. Contrary to the desires of many 
proponents (including the ILO expert quoted 
above), the new scheme does not replace non-
contributory pensions, even for the wealthy; 
                     
10 I owe this point to Susan St. John, who was able to 
convince me, a stubborn foe of means tests, that the 
New Zealand system of recovery of pensions from the 
wealthy via surcharges on their income was a good idea, 
as it introduced some progressivity, at least for elderly 
taxpayers, into what had become essentially a flat rate 
of income tax.  
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rather, it tops up basic pensions with 
contributory pensions designed to replace one-
third of covered earnings.
11 Participation is 
mandatory for workers older than 18 years of 
age, with the exception of employees with very 
low earnings
12, the self-employed, and public 
sector employees. Self-employed workers and 
the unemployed are offered incentives (2/3 
contribution for the same benefit) to participate 
voluntarily, but few do. Workers in the public 
sector have no need to participate because 
Government meets their retirement income 
needs with generous pensions that are income-
related and non-contributory.
13 As a result, the 
scheme covers only half the labour force (some 
280,000 persons) and not every participant 
contributes on a regular basis. 
 
Participants in the new pension scheme are 
required to contribute—up to a ceiling
14—a 
fixed proportion of their salary, set at the rate of 
9% (6% from the employer and 3% from the 
employee). Workers in large sugar estates 
contribute 50% more (via their employers), and 
receive correspondingly greater benefits. In 
exchange for contributions, workers receive 
“pension points” that are re-valued periodically 
                     
                    
11 Contributors to the National Pensions Scheme benefit 
also from life and disability insurance during their 
working lives; this supplements basic widows’, orphans’ 
and disability pensions awarded to residents less than 
60 years of age under the non-contributory system.  Life 
and disability benefits are ignored in this paper in order 
to concentrate on old age pensions. 
 
12  For the fiscal year ending June 2000, mandatory 
contributions were triggered by monthly wages of Rs 
800 (USD 30). 
 
13 Under an occupational scheme that dates from 1859, 
public servants after 331/3 years of service receive two-
thirds of their final pay as a pension, and can retire as 
early as age 50, but never later than age 60. For pension 
purposes, the public sector includes employees of 
‘parastatals’, such as teachers in government-aided 
private schools. Pensions of civil servants are not only 
generous; they are paid on a pay-as-you-go basis, so 
cause problems for public finances as the population 
ages. (See World Bank, 1995, pp. 46-51). 
 
14 The ceiling for contributions in the year ending June 
2000 was a monthly salary of Rs 5,535 (USD 220). 
at the discretion of the Minister of Social 
Security. Upon reaching the normal retirement 
age of 60 years, the value of the accumulated 
pension points can be exchanged for a lifetime 
pension at a rate determined by Government. 
Since July 1988, this rate has been fixed at 11:1. 
Pension points valued, for example, at 110,000 
rupees can be transformed into a monthly 
pension of 833 rupees (Rs 10,000 a year).
15 
 
There is no formal indexation, but 
Government promised that it would revalue 
pension points in accordance with changes in 
average earnings, and created the expectation 
that pensions in payment would benefit from a 
similar adjustment. Government stated this 
explicitly in a White Paper published in April of 
1976: 
 
“The level of earnings on which pensions are 
calculated will be adjusted for changes in the 
average level of earnings up to retirement. This 
process of ‘dynamising’ past earnings will 
ensure that contributions paid into the new 
National Pension Scheme keep their value right 
up to pension age. Once pensions are in 
payment the Government will review their 
level in the light of changes in the cost of living 
and in living standards.” (Mauritius, 1976, p. 
2.) 
 
This did not happen. From the beginning, the 
Minister of Social Security adjusted pension 
points and pensions in payment each year or two 
roughly according to changes in consumer 
prices, not to changes in average wages. Prices 
have increased less than wages; so pensions are 
smaller than promised. 
 
This de facto price indexation need not 
continue in the future. Indeed, the recent 
actuarial review (Mauritius Ministry of Social 
Security, 2001) assumes that the value of 
 
15 The division of 10,000 is by 12, because there is no 
‘13
th month’ bonus for contributory pensions. The rate 
of 11:1 to exchange pension points for a pension is given 
in the actuaries report (Mauritius Ministry of Social 
Security, 2001). The source does not report the rate or 
rates in effect prior to July 1988.   14  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
pension points increase with average wages over 
the next forty years, while the value of pensions 
in payment continue to increase at a slower pace, 
in tandem with consumer prices. There is 
uncertainty how, or even whether, contributions 
and benefits will be adjusted as prices and wages 
rise, which gives present and future pensioners 
cause for concern. 
 
The contributory pension scheme in 
Mauritius is an early example of what has come 
to be known as a “notional defined contribution” 
system. It is “defined contribution” because 
benefits depend strictly on contributions, not on 
final or even the average lifetime income of 
participants. It is “notional” because participants 
do not purchase portfolios of stocks and bonds, 
or shares in an investment fund; instead, they 
receive points, the values of which do not 
depend in any way on how, where, or whether 
their contributions are invested. 
 
When a contributory system of pensions is 
set up, at first there are many contributors and 
few beneficiaries, so there is a lot of revenue and 
little expenditure. Pensioners steadily increase in 
number, but the first to reach pension age have a 
short history of contributions, so are eligible for 
very small pensions indeed. The surplus of 
receipts over expenditures continues until the 
scheme matures, and expenditures equal 
receipts, which might be forty or fifty years. 
This cash surplus is one of the great attractions 
of a contributory scheme. Non-contributory 
pensions make demands on the public purse. 
Contributory schemes make no financial 
demands on government, and can even help out 
by lending funds to the government treasury. 
 
Policymakers everywhere face the decision 
of what to do with surpluses that a pre-funded 
pension scheme generates. In Mauritius, they 
decided “to build up a fund for national 
development” (Smith and Lynes, 1976, p.1) and 
named it the National Pension Fund. At first the 
Fund invested only in government paper. This 
drew criticism from the political opposition, 
which complained that Government was using 
“workers’ contributions to guarantee the wastage 
and dissipation of public funds by Government” 
(Debates, 22 April 1981). Just as beauty is in the 
eye of the beholder, one person’s national 
development is another’s government waste. 
Government reacted to this criticism by 
instructing the Fund to finance a low-interest 
Housing Loan Scheme for the benefit of 
contributors. Eventually, the Fund began also to 
purchase shares and debentures of private 
companies. By 30 June 2002, nearly 10% of the 
Fund’s total portfolio of Rs 22,422 million 
(USD 747 million), was invested in housing 
loans and another 10% in shares and debentures 
of private companies. The remaining 80% was 
held almost entirely in government paper and 
bank deposits. (Mauritius Ministry of Social 
Security, 2002.)  
 
With most of its investments in treasury 
bills and government bonds, the main effect of 
the National Pension Fund has been to ease the 
budget constraint of Government. Government 
has been able to spend more, without the 
necessity of collecting additional taxes, because 
it has access to the contributions of workers who 
are forced to save for their own retirement. 
Revenue can be spent in many ways, and we 
will never know what the spending (or the tax 
revenue) of Government might have been 
without the pension fund. But it is not 
unreasonable to assume that at least part of the 
spending was to improve the lot of pensioners. 
That was, after all, the stated purpose of the 
National Pensions Act of 1976. Was it 
coincidence that Government decided that very 
year to increase the generosity of the basic, non-
contributory pension? If not, then it is possible 
that the contributory pension scheme, far from 
replacing the non-contributory scheme, gave it 
new life by easing the budget constraint of 
Government. 
 
Many workers who joined the new 
contributory pension scheme were unable, 
because of their age, to accumulate many credits 
or points before retiring on a tiny pension. 
Government has set up two programmes to aid 
this first generation of contributors to the 
National Pension Fund. Both programmes 
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financed by general government revenue, the 
other directly by surpluses of the Fund itself. 
 
The first programme guarantees a minimum 
pension for every participant, regardless of her 
history of contributions. Government has kept 
the purchasing power of this minimum pension 
constant by adjusting it each year for consumer 
price inflation. In the fiscal year ending June 
2000, the minimum contributory pension was Rs 
219 (USD 9) a month. Though not a large sum, 
it is a windfall for someone who may have 
contributed only a few months to the National 
Pension Fund before receiving this pension for 
life. The difference between the guaranteed 
pension and the amount that would otherwise 
have been payable is paid by Government out of 
general tax revenue. For the fiscal year that 
ended June 2000, the cost to Government of the 
minimum pension guarantee was 22 million 
rupees, an amount equal to 11.5% of the total 
expenditure on all 31,400 contributory 
retirement pensions in payment, but only 1% of 
the cost of the nearly 112,000 non-contributory 
pensions in payment that year (Mauritius 
Ministry of Social Security, 2001, table 11. p. 26 
and table D7, p. 53).
16 
 
The second programme is more costly, and 
is financed, not out general government revenue, 
but by the National Pension Fund itself. Because 
the Fund provides a subsidy to the first 
generation of participants, its investment 
portfolio is smaller. This could be viewed as 
unimportant, a mere accounting device. 
Government could pay for this programme out 
of general revenue, just as it pays for the cost of 
guaranteed minimum pensions, and loans from 
the fund (increased holdings of government 
paper) could finance the expenditure. This 
would be an alternative accounting device, for 
the same end. The accounting is important, 
                     
16 In fiscal year 1999/2000, contributory pensions in 
payment averaged Rs 510 (USD 20) per month. Detailed 
statistics are not available, but the median (mid-point of 
the distribution) is likely to be even smaller, with a 
significant percentage receiving only the minimum 
pension. The average non-contributory old age pension 
in payment that same year was more than three times 
as large, Rs 1,645 per month. 
however, for it influences very much who bears 
the burden of this subsidy, contributors to the 
Fund or taxpayers in general. 
 
The subsidy financed by the Fund is given 
to all participants who were aged 20 to 59 years 
in July of 1978. Workers who were older than 
40 years of age in July 1978 receive double the 
normal number of pension points for their 
contributions, thus a pension twice as large as 
they would be entitled to under normal rules. 
Workers younger than 40, but at least 20 years 
old in July 1978 receive sufficient bonus to 
qualify for the pension they would have received 
had they contributed at the same rate for a full 
40 years.  The formula for bonus points for this 
age group is (X-20)/(60-X), where X is age in 
July 1978, provided it is between 20 and 40. A 
worker who was 35 years old in 1978, for 
example, is credited with 15/25 (60%) more 
pension points, hence collects a 60% larger 
pension than would normally be payable, on 
retirement in the year 2003. A worker who was 
21 years old when the scheme commenced 
receives a subsidy of only 1/39, little more than 
a 2.5% increase in the pension that is payable 
beginning in the year 2117. 
 
Younger workers, those born after July 
1958, are unlikely to benefit from a pension 
guarantee and accumulate only the normal 
amount of points for their contributions, without 
a subsidy. They can expect only a normal 
pension on retirement. Or, can they? If one takes 
as a basis for ‘normal’ pensions, revaluation of 
pension points each year by changes in average 
earnings, then pensions that the younger 
generation will receive already are smaller than 
those promised by Government. They may have 
to increase their rate of contribution and accept 
even smaller pensions, for the actuaries 
(Mauritius Ministry of Social Security, 2001, p. 
28) reported that the National Pension Fund is 
not in actuarial balance. Required for full 
advance funding, according to their calculations, 
is an increase in the contribution rate from 9% to 
about 10% of covered income, combined with 
an increase in the rate of exchange of pension 
points from 11:1 to 12:1. These changes are 
necessary only because Government insists that   16  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
all benefits be pre-funded, and then only because 
it charges the Fund for subsidies given to the 
first generation of participants. If all subsidies 
were paid from general government revenue, as 
the minimum pension guarantee is, the Fund 
would show an actuarial surplus rather than a 
deficit. Accounting rules are important, for they 
frame policy and determine who, if anyone, in 
the next generation pays for subsidies provided 







6. THE ATTRACTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS 
 
Once non-contributory, basic pensions 
ensure that no elderly person suffers absolute 
poverty, why should government compel 
citizens to save for their own retirement? Tastes, 
preferences and circumstances differ from 
person to person, so why not leave retirement 
savings decisions to individual choice? 
Governments rarely abstain from forcing their 
citizens to save for their old age, and they are 
not behaving capriciously. They are attracted to 
contributory pensions as a tool to advance any or 
all of the following goals:   
 
•  Increase national saving; 
•  Avoid redistribution of income and 
wealth; 
•  Ensure that living standards of workers 
do not fall in retirement; 
•  Build up a fund for government use.  
 
Both the first, and especially the second goal 
require contributory pensions to replace 
universal, basic pensions. The other two goals 
can easily accommodate a contributory pension 
scheme without cutting entitlements to non-
contributory, basic pensions. 
 
                     
17 Recall the 8 April 1958 promise of a government 
minister  “There will be of course no burden placed on 
the coming generations as soon as this contributory 
scheme is introduced.” (See above, section 2, pp. 3-4.) 
(a)  Increase national saving 
 
  At various times in Mauritius, proponents 
of contributory pensions have stressed the need 
for each person to save for his or her own 
retirement, in order to relieve future generations 
from this burden. As stated, however, the 
argument is incomplete, for it fails to explain 
how personal savings are to be transformed into 
national savings.  
 
Consider a simple thought experiment, 
using a framework known as an overlapping 
generation model. Imagine a country whose 300 
residents live only three years; they are 
successively young, middle-aged, and old. The 
population is stationary, so births equal deaths 
and generations are always of equal size (100). 
There is no inflation, and the interest rate is zero. 
The young and the middle-aged pay taxes to 
finance a non-contributory pension of 2 rupees 
given to each of the old. The annual cost of 
universal pensions (transfer to the old) is 200 
rupees, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by a 
tax of one rupee on each of the 200 non-old 
residents of the country. Initially (in year 0 of 
the table below) there are no contributory 
pensions, and there is no pension fund. The 
young and the middle-aged bear the burden of 
paying for the pensions of the old. 
 
Table 2. Hypothetical Overlapping Generations  
               Model 
 
Pension fund   
Yr 
   
Young 
 Middle- 
  aged 
 
Old  Deposit Withdrawal 
Transfers 
to old 
 0  - Rs 100  - Rs 100  + Rs 200  0  0  Rs 200 
 1  - Rs 100  - Rs 100  + Rs 200  Rs 200  0  Rs 200 
 2  - Rs 100  - Rs 100  + Rs 200  Rs 200  Rs 100  Rs 100 
 3  - Rs 100  - Rs 100  + Rs 200  Rs 200  Rs 200  0 
 4  - Rs 100  - Rs 100  + Rs 200  Rs 200  Rs 200  0 
Note: Illustrative numbers. A non-contributory pension scheme 
becomes contributory and pre-funding begins in year 1. Build-up 
of the fund is complete in year 2.  See text for details. 
 
In year 1 Government introduces a 
contributory pension scheme, and allows each 
young and middle-aged person to save one rupee 
for old age, rather than pay it in taxes. In year 1, 
200 deposit a total of 200 rupees into the 
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200. The old in year 1 have not saved for their 
own pensions (they were paying taxes instead), 
so have to rely on government. Government has 
no tax revenue in year 1, but can borrow Rs200 
from the pension fund to finance pensions of the 
old that year. In sum, in year 1, the year the 
contributory pension scheme is inaugurated, 
personal saving increases by Rs200, but 
government debt increases by the same amount, 
so national saving is unchanged. 
 
The following year (year 2) another 200 
rupees are deposited, but the generation that was 
middle-aged in year 1 is now old, and withdraws 
its savings, so net personal saving is Rs 100. 
Those who are old in year 2 were “born” in year 
0, so were able to save for only one year, enough 
for a pension of only 1 rupee. To provide them 
with a full pension, government must double 
their contributory pensions, to 2 rupees. This 
requires Rs 100, which government again 
borrows from the pension fund. 
 
The balance of the pension fund in year 2 is 
Rs 300, all of which is held as government debt. 
From year 3, deposits are equal to withdrawals, 
so net personal saving is zero, and the balance in 
the fund remains at Rs 300, as does government 
debt, since every old person has now saved for 
her own retirement. Personal savings in this 
economy have increased by Rs 300, national 
savings are unchanged, and government debt has 
increased by Rs 300. The only effect the 
introduction of a contributory scheme had was 
to transform implicit government debt into 
explicit debt, held as the investment portfolio of 
the pension fund. The explicit debt is the 
subsidy given to pensioners in year 1 and year 2, 
during the build-up phase of the pension fund. 
 
Why is the implicit debt of the pay-as-you-
go, non-contributory system equal to Rs 300? 
Why not Rs 400 or some even larger sum?  In 
year 0 there are 200 residents who expect to 
receive, from government, a pension of 2 rupees 
when they become old, and 2 times 200 is 400, 
not 300. Or, why is the implicit pension debt, 
before the system is reformed, not infinite? After 
all, an infinite number of unborn generations can 
expect to receive a non-contributory, universal 
pension when they become old. 
 
There is a reason why the implicit debt is 
Rs 300 rather than Rs 400 or an infinite sum. It 
is because the middle-aged in each year have 
paid taxes in two years, so have acquired the 
right to a full pension, whereas the young have 
paid taxes only in one year, so have acquired 
rights to only half a pension. The unborn have 
not paid any taxes, so have not acquired any 
entitlement. The cost of a full pension for 100 
persons is 200 rupees, and the cost of half a 
pension for the same number is 100 rupees. The 
figure of Rs 300 is the sum of these two 
entitlements. 
 
We have seen in this illustration that 
personal saving has no effect whatsoever on 
national saving. This happens because 
government borrows all surpluses from the 
pension fund to subsidize pensioners who are 
too old to save enough for a full pension. The 
outcome would be quite different if government 
were to finance the subsidies by taxing rather 
than borrowing. In table 2, the 200 residents 
who are not yet old would be subject in year 1 to 
a tax of one rupee each in addition to the 
compulsory saving of one rupee, and in year 2 
the tax would amount to one-half a rupee. This 
increase in national savings comes about 
because of an increase in taxes, and does not 
require advance funding of pensions; fiscal 
austerity alone can produce the same result. 
Pension reform, though, is sometimes appealed 
to as a way to make tax increases more 
acceptable to the electorate. 
 
We have assumed, for simplicity, that 
contributory pensions are set equal to the old 
non-contributory pensions. Government can 
force citizens to save additional amounts, for 
example by setting contributions proportional to 
income. If this generates surpluses in the 
pension fund greater than the amount required to 
subsidize the first two generations of pensioners, 
the result could be increased national saving, 
even without increases in taxes. On the other 
hand, national saving could fall if government 
borrows from the pension fund to finance 
current consumption and contributors adjust   18  DESA Discussion Paper No. 32 
 
 
their own portfolios by reducing other saving. 
Anything can happen to national saving in 
theory; what actually happens must be 
measured, which turns out to be quite a difficult 
task. Barr (2000, p. 14) summarizes “a large, 
complex and controversial literature” in the 
following way: “The magnitude of the impact of 
funding on growth is controversial. Though 
there is some empirical evidence that funding 
contributes to higher savings in the United 
States, there is no robust evidence of a similar 
effect elsewhere.” 
 
(b)  Avoid redistribution of income and 
wealth 
 
Avoidance of income redistribution was a 
major force behind contributory pensions from 
the beginning in Mauritius, and was central to 
the Report of the Social Insurance Committee in 
1941. The aim is to spare the taxpayer by 
forcing each worker to save for his or her own 
retirement, i.e. to substitute workers’ 
contributions for the taxes paid 
disproportionately by the wealthy. To pursue 
this goal, a pension plan will ideally exclude 
those who are not poor, since they make no 
demands on Government in their old age, and 
will mandate flat contributions in return for flat 
benefits at a subsistence level.  Dr. Millien, the 
only member of the Social Insurance Committee 
to express a dissenting view, saw this clearly. 
His analysis was correct. The scheme proposed 
in 1941, and the similar one proposed by a 
Committee of Ministers in 1957, would have 
reduced the income and living standards of the 
working poor. In the thought experiment of the 
previous subsection, we abstracted from this 
issue with the simplifying assumption of head 
taxes that do not vary by person, except for the 
old, who are exempt. 
 
(c)  Ensure that living standards of workers 
do not fall in retirement 
 
This goal is paternalistic because it 
represents an attempt to protect not taxpayers, 
but workers themselves. The belief is that at 
least some workers are so short sighted that they 
would consume too much of their wages and 
save too little for retirement if they were allowed 
to choose their own pattern of lifetime 
consumption. The implicit assumption is that 
government knows best: without compulsion, 
individuals make mistakes that they later come 
to regret. So government forces each worker to 
save enough to avoid a drastic fall in his or her 
standard of living in retirement. 
 
Paternalism underlies the recommendations 
of Titmuss and Smith (1961, pp. 107-111) and, 
to a lesser extent (because of Government-
imposed constraints), those of Smith and Lynes 
(1976). With paternalism as the underlying 
motivation, it is important that pensions be 
adequate to allow a retiree to maintain the 
standard of living to which he or she has become 
accustomed, even though this standard is much 
higher than minimum standards of the 
community. Pre-funding is of no consequence; 
the scheme might be financed on a pay-as-you-
go basis, with each generation of workers paying 
for the pensions of the previous generation. In 
essence, the social planner observes that citizens 
face a drop in their income on retirement, so 
forces them to save more (reduce consumption) 
during their working years in order to enjoy 
more consumption in retirement.  
 
The paternalistic motive for contributory 
pensions is strikingly evident in the following 
passage of the Titmuss Report (1961, p. 108): 
 
  “[T]here are various groups of employed 
persons who have become accustomed to a 
somewhat better standard of living but who, 
in their old age, have to rely on the present 
basic pension. Many no doubt get generous 
help from their families but this pension 
alone is inadequate to maintain a reasonable 
standard.... These workers are among the 
most deserving sections of the community; 
teachers in private schools, clerks, skilled 
workers, and certain categories of employees 
of hotels, shops, and various industries.” 
 
The Report clearly states (p. 111) that the 
objective should be “to maintain the whole social 
insurance scheme broadly on a ‘pay-as-you-go’   19  Universal Pensions in Mauritius    
basis, bearing in mind the need to build up ... a 
moderate working balance in the Fund.” Titmuss 
and Smith wanted current contributions to be used 
to aid current pensioners rather than build up 
national savings or  finance other government 
expenditure. 
 
(d)  Build up a fund for government use 
 
The fourth and final rationale for 
compelling workers to participate in a 
contributory scheme is to build up a fund that 
can be used for purposes to be decided by 
government. Smith and Lynes (1976, p. 22), in 
the report commissioned by the Government of 
Mauritius, explicitly state that it “has been the 
Government’s wish to build up a fund to 
promote national development.” We have seen 
that “national development” essentially means 
purchase by the pension fund of government 
bonds, allowing government to decrease taxes or 
increase its spending. Some of this increased 
spending was on basic pensions, by abolishing 
the means test and sharply increasing their 
value. It is interesting to note that in 1958, the 
other year in which the generosity of the basic 
pension peaked, Government also announced its 
intention of introducing a contributory pension 
scheme within two years. The expected inflow 
of cash from contributions may have played a 
role in each of these events, even if expectations 




The World Bank, in its highly regarded 
1994 Report, Averting the Old Age Crisis, 
praised schemes that provide benefits 
 
“to everyone of pensionable age, regardless 
of income, wealth or employment history, as 
in New Zealand and the basic pensions paid 
by the Nordic countries. Administratively, 
this is the simplest structure, with the lowest 
transaction costs, for the public pillar—an 
important advantage in developing countries 
with limited institutional capacities and 
incomplete record-keeping systems.  It avoids 
the disincentive to work and save inherent in 
means-tested plans.  Its universal coverage 
helps ensure that the poverty reduction 
objectives are met, provides a basic income 
for all old people” (p. 240). 
 
Mauritius demonstrates clearly that basic 
pensions for all are not only theoretically 
desirable; they are also affordable and politically 
feasible in a developing country. 
 
Mauritius ended up with a system of 
universal old age pensions by accident, not by 
design. Basic, flat pensions from the very 
beginning in 1950 were regarded as temporary, 
something to take care of the needs of the aged 
until the day a contributory, incomes-related 
system of pensions could be put into place. 
Nonetheless, once the non-contributory system 
was in place, it proved to be both popular and 
durable. The long-awaited arrival of 
contributory pensions in 1978 has been followed 
not with a replacement, but rather the 
strengthening of the basic, flat pensions for all 
elderly residents in the country. 
 
Despite the obvious advantages of simple, 
universal old age pensions, there are very few 
examples in the developing world. Namibia and 
Botswana operate systems of universal pensions, 
and South Africa’s basic pensions are nearly 
universal (Willmore, 2001), but these examples, 
along with Mauritius, seem to be unique. It is thus 
unusual that the Government of Nepal, on of the 
least developed countries in the world, introduced 
in 1995 a universal pension of Rs 100 per month 
(approximately 10% of per capita GDP) for all 
persons over the age of 75, and for “helpless 
widows” 60 to 74 years of age. The value of the 
pension was subsequently eroded by inflation, but 
in fiscal year 1999/2000 the Government 
increased it to Rs 150 per month, equivalent to 
almost 11% of per capita GDP. In 1999/2000, a 
total of 171,322 persons over the age of 75 
benefited from pensions, along with 188,557 
“helpless widows”, for a total of 359,879 
pensioners, 1.6% of the population.
18 The total 
                     
18 If the estimates of the UN Population Division (2000 
Revision) are accurate, the ‘universal’ pension was 
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cost of these pensions, as a share of GDP, was thus 
a very modest 0.0159*0.108 or 0.17% of GDP.  
 
The fact that Nepal started with a universal 
pension at age 75 seems a good idea. Those of 
such an advanced age are in greatest need, and 
the pension is more affordable than it would be 
if younger persons were included. Over time, as 
the country develops, it should be possible to 
provide pensions also to those of younger ages. 
In this, too, Mauritius provides lessons, by 
differentiating its old age pensions by age group. 
The pension for those 75 years of age and older 
could be left larger than that, say, for pensioners 
aged 60-74, allowing for a gradual withdrawal 
from paid labour that is typical in poor 
countries. 
 
Mauritius has had two experiences with 
means tests. The first, lasting from 1950 until 
1958, excluded the wealthiest 20 to 25% of the 
elderly. The second, lasting from around 1965 
through 1976 excluded only those liable for 
income tax, no more than 5% of the elderly 
population. These tests produced fiscal savings, 
but they also sent distorted signals to workers. 
Both tests discouraged low-income workers 
from saving for their old age and from 
continuing to work, even on a part-time basis, 
beyond normal retirement age. The first test was 
the more costly, and more unpopular, of the two 
because it was costly to administer and led to 
invasion of privacy. If, for some reason, it is 
necessary to deny basic pensions to wealthier 
members of society, it is far better to do this 
through the existing tax system. Mauritius did 
this by recovering, in effect, the entire pension 
from anyone who filed an income tax return. It 
would have been better to ‘claw back’ the 
pension gradually, by collecting a surcharge on a 
pensioner’s taxable income, as was done until 
recently in New Zealand (St. John and 
Willmore, 2001). If the rate of surcharge plus 
normal income tax is not confiscatory, it will 
                                     
age 75. It is not known how many women aged 60-74 are 
widowed, nor if a means test is applied, but “helpless 
widows” comprise 34% of the female population of that 
age group. 
 
have little adverse effect on incentives for work 
and for saving.  A portion of the pension can be 
recovered from pensioners who continue to 
work or have investment income simply by 
making the non-contributory pension taxable as 
ordinary income. This is done in both Mauritius 
and New Zealand, with excellent results.   21  Universal Pensions in Mauritius    
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Elderly Average Per capita Consumer Pension
GDP Persons Pensioners pension GDP Price Index Costs
Year ending December (Rs million) (Rs 000) (Rs 000) (CPI) (% of GDP)
1950 577.9 15440 10545 80 1201 0.29
1951 653.4 16052 13965 168 1311 0.36
1952 737.9 16641 12304 179 1429 0.30
1953 752.1 24075 19002 167 1403 0.42
1954 751.9 24673 20456 211 1357 0.57
1955 716.7 25093 18429 239 1254 0.61
1956 840.5 24367 19031 234 1420 0.53
1957 877.3 24584 19607 236 1439 0.53
1958 781.8 25883 25783 303 1246 1.00
1959 823.9 26303 26714 262 1511 0.85
1960 761.6 26788 N/A N/A 1148 N/A
1961 901.0 28635 28407 N/A 1324 N/A
1962 929.1 30984 29355 263 1327 0.83
1963 1192.7 32366 N/A N/A 1670 6.94 N/A
1964 1028.6 33731 31430 264 1399 7.07 0.81
1965 1080.8 43181 38064 260 1432 7.19 0.92
1966 1069.1 44205 39198 265 1382 7.37 0.97
1967 1135.9 45623 40393 267 1441 7.51 0.95
1968 1132.4 46751 41760 266 1409 8.04 0.98
1969 1214.5 47513 42670 267 1490 8.22 0.94
1970 1228.6 48563 43761 270 1482 8.35 0.96
1971 1361.0 49670 46625 266 1619 8.38 0.91
1972 1678.6 51525 47482 305 1973 0.86
1973 2171.0 54118 49038 326 2497 0.74
Fiscal year ending June
1972 1520 50200 46747 289 1796 8.83 0.89
1973 1925 52849 48279 298 2235 10.01 0.75
1974 2970 55386 49592 391 3389 12.93 0.65
1975 3887 57300 52415 485 4385 14.84 0.65
1976 4354 58021 53895 668 4847 16.76 0.83
1977 5073 59664 58348 965 5567 18.29 1.11
1978 5850 60943 60012 1158 6316 19.86 1.19
1979 6949 62404 61631 1266 7373 22.73 1.12
1980 8168 63459 63000 1298 8523 32.28 1.00
1981 9453 65730 N/A NA 9708 36.95 N/A
1982 10967 67704 N/A NA 11113 41.16 N/A
1983 12244 70277 N/A NA 12277 43.46 N/A
1984 13562 72461 N/A NA 13464 46.68 N/A
1985 15489 75528 74168 2277 15235 49.80 1.09
1986 18159 78453 77957 2574 17720 50.62 1.11
1987 21961 80503 80811 2762 21268 50.88 1.02
1988 26452 82253 83102 3244 25436 55.54 1.02
1989 30978 84681 85641 3835 29573 62.57 1.06
1990 36451 87527 87195 4264 34540 71.01 1.02
1991 41973 88605 89274 5914 39420 75.99 1.26
1992 46975 89513 91208 7284 43591 79.51 1.41
1993 53102 91248 92950 7959 48662 87.88 1.39
1994 59807 93457 96254 8704 54108 94.31 1.40
1995 66063 95393 101665 9666 59113 100.00 1.49
1996 73196 97528 103804 11470 64883 106.55 1.63
1997 81869 99272 107106 14781 71753 113.83 1.93Appendix A (concluded). 
Elderly Average Per capita Consumer Pension
GDP Persons Pensioners pension GDP Price Index Costs
(Rs million) (Rs 000) (Rs 000) (CPI) (% of GDP)
Fiscal year ending June
1998 93159 101274 108784 16222 80719 121.59 1.89
1999 103667 102748 109571 18689 88810 129.99 1.98
2000 113265 105234 111885 19738 95953 135.44 1.95
2001 125608 109180 113051 21976 105269 142.70 1.98
Note: Elderly persons are defined by the qualifying age for pensions, 65 years in 1950, lowered to 60 years for females in 1953,
         to 60 years for males commencing in 1965.
Source: Author's estimates, based on data from varied publications of the Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Social
            Security of Mauritius and (for CPI only) International Financial Statistics of the IMF.   
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